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THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON PRODUCTIVITY 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: 
THE CASE OF MUNICIPAL LIBRARIES 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Joshua L. Schwarz 
I. Introduction 
Research by economists on the economic 
effects of unions in the private sector has 
tended to focus on unions' effects on their 
members' relative earnings postions. Following 
in the tradition of H.G. Lewis' pioneering 
work, a large number of studies have addressed 
this question.1 The more sophisticated ones 
use micro-level data and seek to control both 
for quality differentials and the possibility 
that wages and union status may be siraultan-
EHRENBERG is Professor of Economics and Labor 
Economics and SCHWARZ is a graduate student 
at the New York State School or Industrial and 
Labor Relations at Cornell University. 
This research was supported by National Science 
Foundation grant No. DAR 80-14279. 
^H.G. Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in 
the United States (Chicago, University of Chi-
cago Press, 1963). 
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eously determined.2 Most recently, other non-
wage outcomes, such as job satisfaction and 
labor turnover, have been considerd and ana-
lysts have attempted to ascertain if part of 
any observed union/nonunion wage differential 
merely compensates unionzed employees for rela-
tively unfavorable nonpecuniary conditions - of 
employment•-* 
The traditional neoclassical view of un-
ions asserts that although unions may benefit 
their members by creating noncompensating wage 
differentials, they cause allocative efficiency 
losses* Hence, their net impact on the economy 
r 2See Peter Schmidt and Robert Strauss, "The 
Effect of Unions on Earnings and Earnings on 
Unions: A Mixed Logit Approach," International 
Economic Review (February 1976); Lung-Fei Lee, 
"Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equa-
tions Model With Qualitative and Limited Depen-
dent Variables," International Economic Review 
(June 1978); and Peter Schmidt, "Estimation of 
a simultaneous Equations Model With Jointly 
Dependent Continuous and Qualitative Variables: 
The Union-Earnings Question Revisited," inter-
national Economic Review (June 1978). 
3See Gregg Duncan and Frank Stafford, "Do 
Union Members Receive Compensating Wage Differ-
entials," American Economic Review (June 1980); 
George Borjas "Job Satisfaction, Wage and 
Unions," Journal of Human Resources (Winter 
1979); Richard Freeman, "Individual Mobility 
and Collective Voice in the Labor Market," 
American Economic Review (May 1976); and James 
Medoff, "Layoffs and Alternatives Under Trade 
Unions in United States Manufacturing," Ameri-
can Economic Review (June 1979). 
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as a whole Is thought to be negative.* Recent-
ly, however^ this view has been challenged by 
Richard Freeman, James Medoff, and their as-
sociates at Harvard.5 Drawing on hypotheses 
put forth long ago by institutional economists, 
they argue that unions may well increase pro-
ductivity. Such increases may occur through a 
number of routes including union-Induced reduc-
tions in turnover, increases in morale and 
motivation, and increses in formal and informal 
on-the-job training. Indeed, several of their 
econometric studies suggest that union/nonunion 
productivity differentials in the private sec-
tor are often positive.*> To the extent that 
these results are generalizable, one must be-
4See, for example, Albert Rees, The Economics 
of Work and Fay, 2nd ed. (New York, Harper and 
Row, 1979), chapter 10, for a summary of the 
neoclassical view, which does not necessarily 
represent his personal view. 
5
 A good nontechnical treatment of their views 
is round in Richard Freeman and James Medoff, 
"The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest 
(Fall 1979). 
"See, for example, Charles Brown and James 
Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Production Pro-
cess," Journal of Political Econoay (June 
1978), for evidence for U.S. manufacturing; Kim 
Clark, "Unions and Productivity in the Cement 
Industry" (unpublished Harvard University 
Ph.D. dissertation, 1978) and his "The Impact 
of Unionization and Productivity: A Case Stu-
dy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
(July 1980), for evidence for the cement indus-
try, and Steven Allen, "Unionized Construction 
Workers Are More Productive?" (mimeograph, 
1979), for evidence for the U.S. construction 
industry. Lest one conclude that unions always 
Increase productivity, the evidence available 
for coal mining in the U.S. suggests this is 
not true. See Marie Cpnnerton, Richard Free-
man, and James Medoff, "Productivity and Indus-
trial Relations: The Case of U.S. Bituminous 
Coal" (miraeo, 1979). 
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come much more agnostic on the question of 
whether unions in the private sector have had 
net adverse efficiency effects. 
Research on the effects of unions in the 
public sector has paralleled the private sector 
studies. Numerous studies have sought to as-
certain the effect of public sector unions on 
the relative wages of teachers, police, fire-
fighters and other categories of municipal em-
ployees.? Recent studies have moved beyond 
wage effects and analyzed the effects of public 
sector unions on nonwage employee benefits and 
on the trade-off between wages and retirement 
system characteristics.8 
In contras t to the private sector re-
search, however, no research has been directed 
towards ascertaining the effects of unions on 
productivity in the public sector. This fact 
is not completely surprising; the concepts of 
output and productivity in the public sector 
'See, for example, Orley Ashenfelter, "The Ef-
fect of Unionization on Wages In the Public 
Sector: The Case of Firefighters," Industrial 
and Labor Relatloos Review (January 1971); Ron-
ald Ehrenberg and Gerald Goldstein^ "A Model of 
Public Sector Wage Determination,' Journal of 
Urban Economics, July 1975; and Hirschell Ras-
per, "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on 
Public School Teachers' Salaries," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, October 1970). 
°See, for example, David Rogers, "Municipal 
Government Structure, Unions, and wage and Non-
wage Compensation in the Public Sector" (unpub-
lished Cornell University M.S. thesis, 1979); 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "Retirement System Charac-
teristics and Compensating Differentials in the 
Public Sector," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review. July 1980; and Linda M. Edwards and 
Franklin R. Edwards, "The Effect of Unionism on 
the Money and Fringe Compensation of Public 
Employees: The Case of Municipal Sanitation 
Workers" (raimeo, 1979). 
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are often not well-defined and the difficulties 
Inherent in trying to measure productivity are 
consequently large. Nevertheless, the growing 
financial problems of state and local govern-' 
merits suggest that this important problem can-
not be ignored. Prior studies of public sector 
wage determination have indicated, on average, 
that unions have tended to have only modes t 
effects on their members' compensation; studies 
of public employees unions' effects on produc-
tivity are required to complete our understand-
ing of the effects these unions have had on mu-
nicipal finances and service flows* 
This paper represents our initial efforts 
at analyzing the effects of unions on produc-
tivity in the public sector. We first sketch 
an analytical framework that can be used to es-
timate these effects, focusing for expository 
purposes on municipal public libraries. We in-
itially focus on libraries because considerable 
effort has been devoted to conceptualizing pro-
ductivity measures for them and because of the 
availability of data to implement the frame-
work. ^  After discussing the analytical frame-
work, we present preliminary estimtes of the 
effects of unions on productivity in public 
libraries based upon analyses of data from 71 
municipal libraries in Massachusetts. We con-
clude by indicating how these analyses will be 
extended and the direction that we hope our 
future research will take. 
yFor prior discussions of library productivi-
ty, see Malcolm Getz, Public Libraries: An Eco-
nomic View (Johns Hopkins Press, 1980); Karen 
Feldstein, The Economics of Public Libraries 
(unpublished MIT Ph.D. dissertatin, 1977); 
F.W. Lancaster, The Heasureaent and Evaluation 
of Library Services (Washingtn, D.c., 1977): 
and Ernst DeProspo, Ellen Altman, and Kenneth 
Beasley, Performance Measures for Public Libra-
ries (Chicago, 1973). 
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II. A Simple Analytic Framework 
Municipal libraries produce a variety of 
outputs which include, but are not limited to, 
the circulation of books, periodicals, and 
other audio-visual materials, responding to in-
formation and inter-library loan requests, and 
providing reference facilities. These outputs 
can, in theory, be evaluated in both quantita-
tive and qualitative ways. While one can simp-
ly count circulation figures or the number of 
information requests, more sophisticated valua-
tions of library output would focus on ques-
tions like: What proportion of information 
requests were answered correctly? or, How long 
did the typical borrower have to wait for a 
book that he or she wanted? 
For now we shall ignore the fact that 
libraries can be thought of as multiple product 
firms and also ignore the quality dimension of 
the services they provide. Instead, we assume 
that we can treat library output (Q) as being a 
single variable. One can then specify the com-
munity deaand function for library services by 
(1) D = DtpjvjfVg) 
Here P is the "price" the community must 
pay for a unit of library services; other 
things being equal, the higher the price the 
less library services will be demanded. The 
position of the demand curve will depend upon 
community income or wealth, with higher income 
areas demanding more library services, and it 
will also obviously depend upon the size of the 
community (Vj). Finally, the demand curve will 
depend upon the community's "taste" for library 
services (V2)« For example, more highly educa-
ted communities may demand more library servi-
ces, as may communities with a large proportion 
of school-age children. 
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The'second element of our model is a pro-
duction function for library services. 
(2) Q - F(K,L|V3,U) 
Here we have treated output, capital (K) and 
labor (L) as single variables. The capital 
stock includes the library's entire stock of 
materials as of the current period. V3 is a 
vector which represents those community vari-
ables that affect the position or shape of the 
production function. For example, one early 
study found that two-thirds to three-quarters 
of all library users lived within one mile of a 
1ibrary.10 This sugges ts that increases in 
population density, which make it easier to 
locate branch libraries within a mile of all 
individuals, would increase the output of li-
brary services, ceteris paribus* 
The production function for library ser-
vices may also be a function of whether the 
library's employees are represented by a un-
ion. As noted by Freeman and Medoff, unioniza-
tion (U) may well increase productivity through 
routes including union-induced reductions in 
turnover, increases in morale and motivation, 
and increases in formal and informal on-the-job 
training.11 on the other hand, unionization of 
library employees may well reduce productivity 
if it places limits on library management's 
ability to substitute factors of production or 
if it requires library management to devote 
more resources to the contract negotiation pro-
10
 Bernard Berelson, Tike Library is Public 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1949). 
1
 ' Freeman and Medoff, "The Two Faces of Un-
ionism," Public Interest, Fall 1979. 
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cess and to the resolution of grievances. 12
 0f 
key concern to us is what is the net effect of 
unions on the production function? 
The stock of capital that a library has 
depends upon its stock of capital in the pre-
ceding period (K_^), its investment in new 
capital (I), and the rate at which its previous 
stock of capital depreciates ($). The latter 
depends upon the age distribution of the 1 i-
brary's books (in the main, books are used most 
heavily in the initial years following their 
purchase) and the resources that the library 
devotes to maintaining its collection and 
avoiding theft. We shall ignore the latter two 
considerations here and treat the depreciation 
rate as a constant. 
(3) K = I + (I-MK.-L 
The costs incurred by a library are pri-
marily for labor, for new acquisitions, and for 
maintaining the library's collection and build-
ings. Let W be the cost per unit of labor, m 
the per unit cost of maintaining the collec-
tion, and C the user cost of new materials. 
Then the toal costs the library incurs is given 
by 
(4) C = WL + CI + mK~1 
For later reference, remember that a primary 
goal of unions is to increase their members' 
1
* See, for example, Marilyn Oberg, Mary 
Blackburn, and Joan Dible, "Unionization Costs 
and Benefits to the Individual and to the 
Library," in Margaret Chaplan, ed., Employee 
Organizations and Collective Bargaining In 
Libraries, Library Trends, 25, October 1976, 
and Milton Byran, "Implications for Public 
Libraries" in Frederick Schlipf, ed., Col-
lective Bargaining in Libraries (Urbana, Illi-
nois, 1975). 
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wages. To the extent that they are successful, 
W will be an increasing function of U. 
The cost function for library services is 
obtained by minimizing (4), subject to (2) and 
(3). From this, one can obtain the average 
cost function for library services 
(5) AC = AC(2|w,C,m,V3,S,K_1F,U> 
If the underlying library production function 
exhibits constant (decreasing) (increasing) re-
turns to scale, average cost will be constant 
(increase with output) (decrease with output). 
We have plotted the demand curve and aver-
age cost curve for library services in Figure 
1, the latter under the assumption of constant 
average costs. The average cost curve repre-
sents the price to the library of producing 
different levels of library services. Given 
the demand curve, D, Q* units of library ser-
vices will be demanded and produced. At this 
level of library services/ library revenues 
just cover its costs. 
The equilibrium level of library services 
can be expressed as the reduced form equation 
(6) Q* ~ G(V1/v2,V3,W/C,m,$/K_1,F,U) 
Obviously/ anything that shifts the demand 
curve up will increase output while anything 
that shifts the average cost curve up will 
reduce it. The key point to note is that 
observed output is determined by both demand 
and cost factors. 
The effects of unions on service flows 
operate both via their effects on wages and 
their effects on the production function (2). 
If unions do increase the wages of library 
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Price of 
Library Services 
Output 
Figure 1 
The Market for Library Services 
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employees this would shift the average cost 
curve up and reduce output. If unions Increase 
(decrease) the level of output associated with 
any given input levels (for the reasons dis-
cussed earlier) this will shift the average 
cost curve down (up), thereby increasing (de-
creasing) output. 
Equation (6) provides a simple framework 
which can he used to estimate the effects of 
unions on productivity. If cross-section data 
on library services, the demand and cost vari-
ables, and unionization can be obtained, the 
model can be implemented* The coefficient of 
the unionization variable in this model would 
represent the net effect of library unions on 
productivity. If one were to estimate (6) 
omitting the wage variable, however, the coef-
ficient of the unionization variable would cap-
ture both the net effect of unions on the pro-
duction function for library services and the 
effect of union-induced wage gains on average 
costs and, hence, output. 
III. Extensions of the Framework 
The simple framework sketched above may be 
inadequate for a number of reasons. First, the 
wage of library employees in endogenous, in the 
sense that it will be determined both by 
whether the library employees are unionized and 
the forces that affect the demand for library 
services, as well as other variables (V^).1^ 
As such, if one were to specify a wage deter-
mination equation of the form 
(7) W = W(V1,V2,V4,U), 
*•* For a discussion of the variables that in-
fluence public sector wage determination, see 
Ehrenberg and Goldstein, op. clt. 
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it is likely that the error term in this equa-
tion would be correlated with the error term in 
C6). This might happen, for example, if data 
on some variable that affected the demand for 
library services was unavailable and omitted 
from both equations (6) and (7). If correlated 
error terms occurred, biased estimates of (6) 
would result if it was estimated by ordinary 
least squares* 
Second, the extent of unionization, as 
measured by whether a library's employees are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, 
is also likely to be endogenously determined, 
It is not unreasonable to expect that collec-
tive bargaining coverage will be a function 
both of state laws governing public employee 
unionization and the proportions of public and 
private employees in a state that are union 
members. The size of the library is also like-
ly to matter; large libraries may be more bu-
reaucratic in nature and more conducive to un-
ionization. 14 Finally, collective bargaining 
coverage is likely to be related to both the 
estimated wage premium associated with collec-
tive bargaining and the estimated productivity 
differential associated with collective bar-
gaining; the former because it influences both 
employees' demand for collective bargaining 
coverage and library management's resistance to 
it, the latter because the productivity effects 
associated with collective bargaining also 
influence management's resistance to it. 
This suggests the need for a full-blown 
"selectivity bias" corrected model.15 separate 
wage and library output equations can be esti-
mated for libraries covered by and not covered 
1 4
 Theodore Guyton, On ionization: The View-
point of Librarians (Chicago, 1975). 
1 5
 See Lung-Fei Lee, op. cit., for the genesis 
of this approach. 
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by union contracts, in the context of a model 
in which the probability that a library is un-
ionized is determined by the estimated union/ 
nonunion wage and output differentials that ex-
ist for it, as well as other explanatory vari-
ables . The appendix traces out formally how 
this can be done* 
Third, the analyses described above fo-
cuses on the effect of unions on observed out-
put; the latter is determined by both demand 
and cost considerations* One might prefer in-
stead to focus directly on the underlying pro-
duction process for library services and ask 
questions like: Does the existence of unions 
alter library output per employee? Do unions 
affect the substitutability of capital for la-
bor in the provision of library services? Or 
shifting to the case of multiple types of li-
brary employees (e.g., librarians, other pro-
fessional employees, library aides, other cler-
ical employees): Do unions alter the substitut-
ability of different categories of library em-
ployees in the face of relative price changes? 
Such generalizations would involve using a var-
iant of the "production function" approach used 
by Brown and Medoff, and Clark, and/or estimat-
ing the parameters of a production function 
from cost share data. 
For example, if the production function 
for library service in equation (2) can be 
written as • 
(8) Q = AKa[L(l+BU)]1_a 
where B represents the proportionate marginal 
productivity differential of union labor, and U 
equals one if the library is unionized and zero 
otherwise, then 
(9) log(£) « logA + alog(K/L) + (l-a)BU 
Hence, regressing the log of output per library 
employee on those demographic variables that 
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affect library productivity (variables that un-
derlie A), the log of the capital/labor ratio, 
and whether the library is organized would en-
able one to estimate the proportionate marginal 
productivity advantage of union labor.1° The 
extension to allow for nonconstant returns to 
scale or more than one category of labor is 
straightforward in this model. To test for un-
ion effects on substitutability, however, obvi-
ously requires more flexible functional forms 
such as the CBS or translog ones. 
IV. Preliminary Empirical Results: 
The Determinants of Productivity 
in Massachusetts Public Libraries 
In 1977 the International City Management 
Association (ICMA) conducted a survey of 
municipal public libraries, obtaining data on 
library revenues and expenditures, employment 
and wage scales for different categories of 
library employees, the number of books in each 
library, and various measures of library usage 
including circulation, borrowers, and interli-
brary loans. The latter three variables were 
published, by library, in the 1978 Municipal 
Yearbook, and when coupled with published data 
on socioeconomic characteristics of cities 
obtained from the 1977 City and County Data-
book and published data on whether any library 
employees were covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement in each Massachusetts municipal-
ity in 1977, permit us to estimate equations of 
the form 
10 
(10) QKi = fa B ^ r ^ + yKUi + eKi 
K = 1,2,3,4,5 
for a sample of 71 municipal libraries. 
See Brown and Medoff, op. cit. 
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Equation (10) is a condensed version of 
the reduced form library output equation (6) 
derived in Section II. The output measures 
available are interlibrary loans per capita 
(Ql), number of borrowers per capita (0.2). cir-
culation per capita (Q3), interlibrary loans 
per borrower (Q4), and circulation per borrower 
(Qs)> - each measure expressed in natural 
logarithm form. The former three measures may 
be thought of as measures of toal services 
provided, while the latter two may be regarded 
as measures of the quantity of services 
provided per library user. 
The rj are those variables that are ex-
pected to influence library output, either from 
the demand or cost sides of the model. The 
cost side is captured here by population 
density (^l); as noted earlier, previous 
studies have suggested that increased 
population density reduces the cost of 
providing library services, and hence should 
i ncrease library output * The demand s ide is 
represented by a set of variables expected to 
influence a community's preferences for library 
services; these include the percent of the 
population that is female (^ 2)> t n e percent 
nonwhite (r3>, the percents of the population 
that are older than age 18 (r^) and age 65 
(rs), the median education level in the 
community (rg), the female labor force partici-
pation rate (rg), and the fraction of employees 
in the municipality employed in education 
(r^g). The demand side also is represented by 
the community's capacity to pay for library 
services, as measured by the median family in-
come (ry), and per capita intergovernmental re-
venues (rg). Finally, V± as a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether any library employ-
ees in the municipality were covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement in 1977. 
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Several things should be noted about this 
specification. Data limitations in this in-
itial study preclude a number of variables that 
appear in equation (6) from appearing in equa-
tion (10). The omitted variables include the 
wage rates of library employees, the lagged 
stock of library materials, and the rate at 
which library materials depreciate. The esti-
mated coefficients which we report below should 
be considered very tentative then; they may 
well suffer from omitted variable bias• In 
particular, because library employees* wages 
were unavailable in this sample, the coeffi-
cient of the unionization variable will cap-
ture both the net effects Of collective bar-
gaining on the production function for library 
services and of union induced wage gains on 
average costs and hence output. 
Our preliminary estimates of equation (10) 
appear in Table 1. The populations of the mu-
nicipalities in our sample varied from 10,000 
to over 500,000, and to control for hete r-
scedasticity we have weighted each observation 
by the square root of its population. The 
employees were covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement in approximately one-quarter of 
the libraries in the sample. 
Turning first to the vector of variables 
other than unionization, many of these varia-
bles affect library output in a manner consis-
tent with our a priori predictions. An in-
crease in the school age population (decrease 
in r^) increases library usage as does an in-
crease in the proportion of the population over 
age 65 (rs). An increase in the median educa-
tion level of the population (rg) also leads to 
higher usage, as does an increase in t;he pro-
portion of employees who are employed in the 
education industry (rio)* 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Productivity In Massachusetts Public 
Libraries In 1977: Weighted Least Square* 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Ind./Dap. 
Var./Var. 
a 
' l 
xl 
r 3 
r
* 
r 5 
r 6 
a 
r 7 
'.* 
r 9 
r io 
a 
R2 
% 
- . i n 
L 
(3.0) 
-.060 <0.6) 
.138 (2.1) 
- .138 a . 9 ) 
.192 
.487 
-.038 
-.045 
4.873 
3.566 
- .540 
.334 
(1.6) 
(2.0) 
(0.5) 
(0.0) 
(1-2) 
(0.8) 
(1.5) 
«2 
- .056 
.090 
.041 
- .011 
-.006 
.173 
-.014 
.094 
-.879 
(4.3) 
(2.6) 
(1-8) 
(0.8) 
(0.1) 
(2.0) 
(0.5) 
(0.2) 
(0.6) 
2.139 (1.4) 
.256 
.515 
(2.1) 
"3 
-.066 (7.1) 
-.004 (0.2) 
.021 (1.3) 
-.067 (3.8) 
.127 (4.3) 
.186 (3.1) 
.015 (0.8) 
.014 (0.0) 
2.096 (2.1) 
4.668 (4.2) 
- .128 (1.5) 
.731 
ft ~ 71 for a l l equations 
M • coefficient has been n*iltiplled by 1000 
«* 
- .059 (1.6) " 
- .151 (1.6) 
.097 (1.6) 
-.117. (1.7) 
.197 (1.7) 
.313 (1.3) 
- .023 (0.3) 
- .149 (0.1) 
5.752 (1.5) 
1.427 (0.3) 
- .797 (2.3) 
.235 
«S 
-.009 (O.B) 
-.094 (2.8) 
- .020 (0.9) 
- .045 (1.9) 
.132 (3.2) 
.013 (0.2) 
.028 (1.2) 
.080 (0.2) 
2,975 (2.2) 
2.529 (1.7) 
-.3B5 (3.2) 
.417 
l l - log (interllbrsxy loans per capita) 
Q, • log_ (nuninr of borrowers pet capita) 
v-
« 4 " 
log (circulation per capita) 
log (luterlibrary loans per borrower) 
1°S- (circulation per borrower) 
population density 
percent female 
percent nonwhlta 
percent of the population age IS and over 
percent of the population age 63 and over 
nedIan education level 
median family income 
pet capita intergovernmental revenue 
female labor' force participation rate 
fraction of employees In education 
in 1977 
la 1970 
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In contrast, neither of the variables that 
reflect the communities' capacity to pay < rj 
and rg) are significantly related to library 
output* While an increase in the proportion of 
the population that is female (rj) leads to an 
increase in the number of borrowers, a result 
that might be expected if females tend not to 
be in the labor force, an increase in the labor 
force participation rate of females (rg) is 
associated with higher circulation of library 
materials* Finally, an increase in population 
density (r-j) leads to a reduction in library 
output and an increase in the proportion of the 
population that is nonwhite {x$) to higher out-
put.17 
The primary variable of interest to us, of 
course, is the unionization variable. These 
data suggest that libraries covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements have, ceteris pari-
bus, some 29.2 [exp{ *256)-1] percent more 
borrowers per capita than do nonunion librar-
ies* Both circulation and interlibrary loans 
per capita appear to be lower in unionized 
libraries; however, these effects are not sig-
nificantly different from zero. Because of 
these results, it is not surprising that on a 
1 7
 Malcolm Getz, Public Libraries t An Economic . ^  
View, finds a similar negative relationship be- --; 
tween density and library ouput in his study of 
branch libraries in Hew York City. He argues ^ 
that population density may be a proxy for the ..;.* 
rental cost of structures, with more dense
 ;. -| 
areas having higher rental rates. If this .-•' ^  
occurs, the average cost of library services ^| 
may well be higher in denser areas which would ;.£ 
lead, from Figure 1, to a lower level' of li- j| 
brary services. Thus, a negative relationship •••••& 
between population density and library output 
may well be consistent with our model. 
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per borrower basis, circulation and interli-
brary loans are also lower in unionized li-
braries. 18 
How robust are these results to the esti-
mation methods used? Row (1) of Table 2 summa-
rizes compactly the estimated collective bar-
gaining effects from Table 1. Rows (2) and (3) 
show that estimates obtained are virtually 
identical when the method of ordinary least 
squares is used [row (2)J and when an addition-
al variable, median age, is included to more 
fully control for the age distribution of the 
population [row (3)]. 
As noted in Section II, however, all of 
these estimates may well be subject to selec-
tivity bias. Using the method described in the 
appendix, one can attempt to control for this 
problem.19 First, a reduced form probit equa-
tion is estimated that determines the probabil-
ity that a library's employees are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. From these 
equations, one can compute estimates of varia-
bles which are then added to the productivity 
equations to control for the probability that a 
library's employees are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. These "augmented" pro-
ductivity equations can then be estimated by 
ordinary least squares and consistent parameter 
estimates obtained; this is done separately for 
libraries that are covered by collective bar-
gaining agreement and those that are not. 
Finally, the estimated parameters and the mean 
i0Put another way, If an increase in a vari-
able causes the log of X\ to Increase but does 
not affect the log of X5. it is not surprising 
that the log of (X2/X1) " U * * 
1' Ac tually, the method implemented here is 
simpler since It ignores library employees' 
wage rates. 
Table 2 
Estimated Effects of Collective Bargaining Coverage on the 
Logarithms of Library Output Measures: Various 
Estimation Method* and Model Specifications 
(absolute value t statistic) 
Dep. 
Specification/Var. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
«1 
- .540 (1.5) 
- .573 (1.7) 
- .535 
- .994 
(1.5) 
«a 
.256 
.252 
.287 
.186 
) 
(2,1) 
U.B) 
(2.1) 
Q3 
- .129 
- .140 
- .098 
-.277 
I 
(1.5) 
(1.5) 
(1.0) 
«4 
- .797 
- .625 
- .822 
-1.052 
> 
(2.3) 
(2,5) 
(2.3) 
*5 
- .385 (3.2) 
- .393 (2.9) 
- .386 (2.8) 
- . 471 
where (1) weighted least squares (union coefficients from Table 1) 
(2) ordinary least squares estimates - same model as in Table 1 
(3) ordinary least squares estimates - median age added as an additional 
explanatory variable 
(4) selectivity blaa corrected estimates, separate equations estimated 
for union and nonunion sectors (see Appendix A) 
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values of the explanatory variables can be used 
to compute consistent estimates of the union/ 
nonunion productivity differentials. 
Estimates of the reduced form probit 
equation appear in Table 3. The variables that 
appear in the equation include those in the 
output equations as well as population size, 
population growth, and the share of employment 
in the city in a number of industries. These 
latter variables were included because they 
tend to be related to the extent of private 
sector unionization across SMSA's.20 while 
the vector of coefficients is clearly jointly 
significant at the .05 level, most of the indi-
vidual coefficients are statistically insignif-
icant . The few significant coefficients sug-
gest that collective bargaining for library 
employees in Massachusetts tends to occur in 
cities with older populations (*$), higher 
female labor force participation rate (rg), and 
lower levels of service industry employment 
These estimates are then used, as describ-
ed above, to obtain consistent estimates of the 
productivity equations and estimates of the 
union/nonunion productivity differentials.** 
These differentials are summarized in row (4) 
of Table 2; la the main their pattern is very 
similar to the previous results. 
20 See for example, Barry T. Hirsch, "The De-
terminants of Unionization: An Analysis of In-
terarea Differences," Industrial and Labor de-
lations Review, January 1980. 
21 For brevity, we do not report the regres-
sion coefficients for the "selectivity correct-
ed" output equation here. 
332 
Table 3 
Fcoblt EstlNtee of Whether Any Library Employee* Are 
Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement in 1977 
(absolute value asymptotic t ratio) 
Variable Coefficient 
C 17.499 (0.9) 
r j * .119 (0.9) 
r3 
-.189 (0.6) 
- .543 (1.0) 
-.496 (1.7) 
r j ' .541 (1.9) 
r6 .586 (0.9) 
r?« .116 (0.8) 
r8« 3.081 (1.2) 
r 9 30.363 (1.9) 
r 1 0 .011 (0.1) 
r u -.045 (0,6) 
* n - .052 (0.4) 
r ^ -.470 <1.6> 
r1 4 .151 (0.6) 
r l s " .037 (1.4) 
r16» .273 (0.1) 
r 1 ? .0*2 (0.2) 
Log Likelihood -23.746 
X* 32.313 
71 
Where r,, fraction of employee* In manufacturing 
r,- fraction of employees in transportation and 
" public utilities 
r_« fraction of enployees in the service industry 
t.. fraction of employees In construction 
Tj. 1975 population 
r,, percentage population change 1960-1975 
C intercept ten 
'Coefficient has been multiplied by 1000. 
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V. Extensions and Future Directions 
This paper has laid out a methodological 
framework for estimating the effects of unions 
on productivity in the public sector and pre-
sented some preliminary estimates for a sample 
of 71 municipal public libraries in Massachu-
setts * The empirical estimates themselves 
should not be stressed, however, as the under-
lying data suffer from a number of weaknesses! 
First, there are numerous important variables 
omitted from the data set, including wages and 
employment levels of library employees, new 
acquisitions, and the stock of library materi-
als; these omissions may seriously bias the 
estimated union effects. Second, we have not 
made a serious attempt to specify the determi-
nants of whether a library is covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement; only a limited 
number of variables were entered into that 
equation and this could further bias our re-
sults. Finally, the libraries in our sample 
all are located in one state and span a wide 
range of city sizes (under 10,000 to over 
500,000). Since libraries in cities of differ-
ent sizes perform different functions and the 
likelihood of collective bargaining coverage is 
positively related to city size, this will fur-
ther distort our findings. 
We hope to get around all of these pro-
blems in future work* The ICMA has made the 
data tape, upon which their published report on 
municipal libraries was based, available to 
us. This tape provides fairly comprehensive 
data on all of the "library variables" needed 
to implement the various approaches discussed 
In Sections II and III for approximately 250 
cities of population size 25,000 or great-
er. Socioeconomic characteristic variables for 
these cities can be obtained from the 1977 City 
and County Databook. Finally, we have obtained 
data on the collective bargaining coverage of 
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1ibrary employees in these cities by a mail 
survey; our response rate to this survey has 
been well over 90 percent. 
Because these cities do not all lie in one 
state, it will be possible for us to better mo-
del the forces that affect the probability that 
library employees in a city are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. These include 
the extent of public and private unionization 
in a state, variables for which published data 
exist/ as well as the laws governing public 
sector collective bargaining in a state. Our 
colleague, John Burton, has expended consider-
able effort to collect data on, and to define 
the parameters of, these laws and has gene r-
ously made these data available to us. A sub-
stantially better specified probability of 
collective bargaining coverage equation should 
reduce the likelihood that our estimates of 
union productivity effects are subject to 
selectivity bias. 
In addition to our more comprehensive an-
alysis of the effect of unions on productivity 
in public libraries, we also plan to pursue the 
question of the routes by which unions influ-
ence productivity in the public sector. Our 
initial focus in this aspect of the project 
will be on public education and we will make 
use of a unique set of longitudinal data on ed-
ucational outcomes, school district background 
variables, and union contract provisions that 
our colleague, Sam Bacharach, has constructed 
for local school districts in the state of New 
York. Our analyses here will permit us to test 
for the effects of specific union contract pro-
visions on educational outcomes, rather than 
for the effects of collective bargaining cover-
age per se. The longitudinal nature of the 
data will permit the application of econometric 
335 
methods that allow one to control for omitted 
variables that otherwise might bias the analy-
ses.22 j n sum, these methods substantially 
reduce the likelihood that the estimates that 
result will be subject to selectivity bias be-
cause omitted variables that affect the proba-
bility of collective bargaining coverage or 
contract provisions may also affect educational 
outcomes• 
22 For details, see Bona Id G. Ehrenberg, "Un-
ions and productivity in the Public Sector" 
{proposal submitted to the National Science 
Foundation, March 1980). 
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Appendix 
Our goal is to estimate whether libraries 
whose employees are union members are more, or 
less, productive than otherwise identical 
libraries whose employees are not union mem-
bers, and to estimate the extent that unions 
increase library employees' wages. Suppose 
that the output of library i would be Qui if 
its employees were covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement and Qui if its employees were 
not covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Suppose also that the wages the library's 
employees would receive in the two environments 
would be Wui and Wni respectively. Then we can 
define the relative output differential, dq^, 
and the relative wage differential, d^, asso-
ciated with collective bargaining for the i*1*1 
library, as 
(Al) dq± - (Qui-QnO/Qni s log(Qul/Q„i) 
dwi " (Wui-Wni)/Wni - l°S<Wul/Wni) 
In general, it is not possible to observe 
both Qui and Qn^, or Wu^ and Wn± with cross-
section data, as at a point in time either a 
library's employees are covered by an agreement 
or they are not. A naive approach that 
circumvents this problem is to estimate wage 
and output equations separately for employees 
in cities with and without agreements, use the 
estimated coefficients from these regressions 
and the characteristics of a city to compute 
predicted values of the wage and library output 
that would be observed in both sectors, and 
then estimate the differentials by calculating 
the percentage difference in these predicted 
values. 
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More formally^ suppose that we postulate 
that the wage rate library employees would 
receive in a city if they are unionized is a 
log linear function of a vector of variables, 
X, which represent all of the variables that 
would appear in equation (7) in the text/ plus 
a random error term (e-jj) 
<A2)
 logWu. = j| 1 a j u x j u + 6 l i 
and that a similar functional relationship ex-
ists that describes the wage that library em-
ployees would receive in a city if they were 
not unionized. 
K 
(A3) logWni = j I ^ X j . + e2. . 
Suppose also that similar output equations 
could be derived; these correspond to the re-
duced form output equation (6) in the text, 
where the Yj^ represent all of the variables in 
equation (6) save the extent of unionization, 
and 3^ and 4^ are random error terms 
M 
(A4> logOui - jEjBjuYji + e 3 i 
H 
(A5) logQni = jSiB^Yji + e41. 
The naive approach would involve estimating the 
parameters of (A2) and <A4) by ordinary least 
squares from observations on libraries whose 
employees were unionized and the parameters of 
(A3) and (A5) by ordinary least squares from 
observations on libraries whose employees were 
not organized. Given estimates of these param-
eters (ciju» °jn' ^u' ^jn' a n d t n e relevant 
characteristics of a representative city (Xj^, 
Yji)> one can then obtain estimates of the 
relative output and wage differentials from 
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M
 A 
(A6) dgi = log(Qui/Qni) = j^tBju-Bj^Y^ 
K 
<*wi " log<Wui/Wni) = ^(a^-a^JXji. 
As is now well-known, however, estimates 
of wage and output equations from truncated 
samples will not necessarily yield unbiased 
estimates of the parameters of the underlying 
wage and output equations (and hence <3_j and 
d^i) since the assumption that the error term 
in each equation is random and uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables is typi-
cally violated. This occurs because libraries 
are not randomly assigned to collective bar-
gaining status, but rather employees and li-
brary management make explicit choices on the 
matter. Estimates of the wage and output equa-
tions that ignore the underlying choice model 
will be biased because they will confound the 
effect of an explanatory variable on wages and 
output with its effect on the probability that 
the library's employees are covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement. To correct for 
this saaple selectivity problem requires us to 
model the underlying economic choice process 
that determines whether a library's employees 
are unionized. This problem is complicated by 
the fact that such an event is a product of 
both employee and employer decisions. 
To keep our estimation problem manageable, 
we assume that the choice process that deter-
mines whether a library's employees are covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement can be 
approximated by 
(A7) S* = 60dqi + 5 ^ + r£3«rZri + Vi 
0j_ = 1 if s| > O 
= 0 otherwise 
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Here S^ is an unobserved variable that 
represents the likelihood that a municipal 
library will be unionized, v^ is a random error 
term, and the Zr^ are all of the variables ex-
pected to influence the probability of observ-
ing a collective bargaining agreement, other 
than dqi and d^. The paramenter ' ^  is assumed 
to be greater than zero, as positive output ef-
fects resulting from collective bargaining 
should reduce employers' opposition to collec-
tive bargaining. The sign of &j is indetermin-
ate, however, as positive union/nonunion wage 
differentials will increase library employees' 
demand for collective bargaining, but also in-
crease municipal employers' attempts to resist 
unionization• 
Although S^ is not observed, we can arbi-
trarily scale its cut-off value to be zero, so 
that if Si is greater than zero, the library's 
employees will be covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement (Oi = 1). Similarly, if the 
index is less than or equal to zero, the em-
ployees would not be covered by an agreement 
(Ui - 0). 
Consistent estimates of the model specifi-
ed in (A1) through (A7) can be obtained using 
an iterative procedure originally suggested by 
Lung-fei Lee** One can substitute the wage and 
output equations (A2) to (AS) into (A1) and 
(A7) to obtain a reduced form probit selection 
model 
(A10) S*= J ^ X ^
 + n± 
*Lung-fei Lee, op.cit. 
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where the x£± are all of the predetermined 
variables in the model (X, Y, and Z's) and n± 
is a random error term. Now suppose that the 
error terms from this reduced form selection 
model and the wage and library output equations 
are jointly normally distributed with means 
zero and the following covariance matrix 
(All) 
r— "1 
eli 
e2i 
e3i 
e4i 
ni 
~"•* 
- N 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 » 
°11 al2 a13 °14 aln 
021 CT22 °23 a24 CT2n 
CT31 a32 a33 °34 a3n 
°41 a42 °43 °44 a4n 
anl an2 °n3 an4 CTnn 
Under these assumptions one can show that 
K 
(A12) E(logWu i |x : , i ,U i - 1) - j l l ^ u X j i 
+ C W ^ n H l u + h l i 
(A13) E C l o ^ i l X j i . U i - 0) - ^ " j n X j i 
+ (°2n/ an)X in + h 2 i 
and 
M 
(A14) EClogQ^lYji.Ui - 1) - jIlBjuYji 
+ (a3n/an>Xiu + h 3 i 
(A15) EClogQnilYji.Di - 0) - jIlB-^Yji 
+ (°4n/CTn)Ain + Hi 
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Here the h^ are normally distributed random 
variables with mean zero and the X^ are given 
by 
T
 * (A16) X i u = tC-t^BtXti/On) 
/[I -*(-tClBtXti^n)] 
*in - " • (-t£l»txtVlcrn> 
/$(-tIlBtXti/Oti) 
where <K ) denotes the normal probability den-
sity function and $ the corresponding distribu-
tion function. 
Equations (A12) through (A16) make It 
clear why OLS estimates of the underlying wage 
and output equations (A2) through (A5) may lead 
to biased estimates. As long as the error 
terms in the wage or output equations are cor-
related with the error term in the reduced form 
selection rule (ainfO, 0 2nf0> ^3^0, a4n^°) 
OLS estimates will be biased due to an omitted 
variable. While X i u and ^±n are not directly 
observed, estimates of them may be obtained by 
first estimating the reduced form probit selec-
tion model (A10) obtaining estimated coeffi-
cients (Bt/oa)» atu* t n e n using these estimates 
to compute predicted values X^u and X ^ n for 
each individual. Lee (1978) shows that estima-
tion of (A2) to (A5) by OLS, with A i u (\ ±n) 
added as an additional explanatory variable, 
over a sample of libraries that are covered by 
(not covered by) a collective bargaining agree-
ment, will lead to consistent estimates of the 
a-ju and Bju (a j n and Bjn). Consequently, con-
sistent estimates of the estimated wage and 
output differentials associated with collective 
bargaining coverage may be obtained from (A6). 
